Ontological preference for microphysical causes; 6. If the statue is gouged it still exists, but not exactly that piece of gold which originally occupied the statue's borders, and the mass of gold within that piece can survive dispersal, while the piece cannot. Elder Many philosophers suppose that sameness and difference, among the world's objects, obtain only relative to our conventions for individuation, our conceptual scheme, etc. Finally, he argues that many of the objects in which common sense believes really exist, including artifacts and biological devices shaped by natural selection, and that we too exist, as products of natural selection. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 43 2005 , pp. The real reason why removing one atom does not destroy doubles as a reason why removing many does. For abstracts of other papers that might be of interest, click on the title.
A property's identity lies in its differing to different degrees from its proper contraries, in other words, lies in its place in a contrary-space. Individuation via contraries avoids these problems and moreover implies interesting results, e. This paper examines typical examples of such 'strange' objects and argues that the prediction of equal success is not believable. I started doing Hegel-free metaphysics. The usual premise is that schemes for 'carving' objects out of the world quite different from our actual scheme could afford us equal success in practice and theory.
If argon atoms, water, and stars have essential properties, so do many artifacts. He argues that the shadows are indeed really there, because their sources - familiar objects - are mind-independently real. Click for an Philosophical Quarterly, 50 2000 , pp. This paper argues that this line of thought sets up the wrong agenda in metaphysics. But brain events do not cause muscle contractions, hence, bodily movements, directly. The main examples are dispositional properties, so the paper also argues that being dispositional is no bar to a property's being real in its own right.
Elder Are judgments and wishes really brain events or brain states which will be affirmed by a completed scientific account of how human behavior is caused? W przypadku pytań lub wątpliwości prosimy o kontakt. On the traditional conception of natural kinds, members share a distinctive microstructure which, thanks to the laws of nature, grounds further commonalities. Most contemporary metaphysicians are sceptical about the reality of familiar objects such as dogs and trees, people and desks, cells and stars. But for many genuine contraries Armstrong's analysis fails; their incompatibility cannot be reduced to facts of identity. The Problem of Harmonizing Laws Crawford L. Please click for the paper.
This paper argues that it does reflect a confusion--the confusion of seeing non-actual worlds as separated spatially, not modally, from the actual world. The sensory stimuli which trigger the frog's gulp-launching signal may be a poor guide to the signal's content. So it is crucial, this paper argues, whether they are characterized as biological events--performances of naturally-selected-for operations--or instead as complex microphysical events. Content and the Subtle Extensionality of '. Elder argues that all such attempts to 'explain away' familiar objects project downwards, onto the tiny entities, structures and features of familiar objects themselves. Elder begins by defending realism about essentialness.
In Real Natures and Familiar Objects Crawford Elder defends, with qualifications, the ontology of common sense. Kripkean Externalism versus Conceptual Analysis Crawford L. Elder If a desk is crushed, should ontology say that an object has been destroyed, or merely that the matter of the desk has gotten re-arranged? Click for an Facta Philosophica, 5 2003 , pp. The reason: if there are mind-independent persistence conditions for the objects of nature, they derive largely from the membership-conditions for natural kinds to which those objects belong—but a particular object can, it seems, belong to two natural kinds, one more specific and one more general. Cena może ulec zmianie po wycenie. Alexander's Dictum and the Reality of Familiar Objects Crawford L.
The starting point of his argument is that ontology should operate under empirical load—that is, it should give special weight to the objects and properties that we treat as real in our best predictions and explanations of what happens in the world. Most contemporary metaphysicians are sceptical about the reality of familiar objects such as dogs and trees, people and desks, cells and stars. Familiar predicates work because, as evidence attests, they pick out properties that fall into contrary ranges. The starting point of his argument is that ontology should operate under empirical load -- that is, it should give special weight to the objects and properties that we treat as real in our best predictions and explanations of what happens in the world. Most contemporary metaphysicians are sceptical about the reality of familiar objects such as dogs and trees, people and desks, cells and stars. They prefer an ontology of the spatially tiny or temporally tiny. Supposedly, a dimension of extension which diverges from C-extension only at non-actual worlds, and only when these worlds are treated as being actual.
He contends that sceptical metaphysicians are thus employing shadows of familiar objects, while denying that the entities which cast those shadows really exist. This book argues that there really are in the world at least many of the medium-sized objects that common sense believes in. Should we conclude, via sorites reasoning, that such objects do not really exist? Elder Does Naming and Necessity show that we have no useful a priori knowledge about the reference of rigid designators in science and philosophy? So anyone claiming artifacts are merely our projections must say that the customs which cause the projecting are equally unreal--an incoherent position. He contends that sceptical metaphysicians are thus employing shadows of familiar objects, while denying that the entities which cast those shadows really exist. A slightly shorter version of this paper will appear in Justine Kingsbury, Dan Ryder, and Ken Williford, eds. The members are copied from previous members under selective pressure, and the environment which does the selecting is responsible for the commonalities.