Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function New York: Oxford University Press, 1993 , 194. Less formally: Consider all possible not actual worlds in which someone always chooses the right. In the final chapters Professor Plantinga applies his logical theories to the elucidation of two problems in the philosophy of religion: the Problem of Evil and the Ontological Arguement. If that subpart were actual in the real world , then they would choose the wrong. At one point in this volume, Plantinga makes the claim that the de jure question is not independent of the de facto question. A possible world is the way things could have been, a possible state of affairs 44. In addition to Plantinga's free will defense, there are other arguments purporting to undermine or disprove the logical argument from evil.
The Blackwell encyclopedia of modern Christian thought. I will imagine that a god, or a God if you like, exists in my mind, and only in my mind, as you ask for. A God that exists in your mind and also outside your mind is greater. Essences and proper names -- 4. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at the University Of Notre Dame, where he taught for 28 years until retiring in 2010. It follows then that God does not exist. Proper names and negative existentials : Russell -- 9.
This is a reissue of a book which is an exploration and defence of the notion of modality 'de re', the idea that objects have both essential and accidental properties. Plantinga's argument is that even though God is omnipotent, it is possible that it was not in his power to create a world containing moral good but no moral evil; therefore, there is no logical inconsistency involved when God, although wholly good, creates a world of free creatures who choose to do evil. The first is the presumption that God can force humans to use their free will only for good — which is an inherent contradiction, because if this were so, their actions would no longer be free. Plantinga concludes his discussion with the Ontological Argument. First, Plantinga pointed out that God, though , could not be expected to do literally anything. Also appointed director of the at Notre Dame, which becomes the hub of work in the field. In the case of natural evil, the creatures in view are Satan and his cohorts.
He is also renowned for his epistemological argument that belief in God can be rational without requiring arguments or evidence, claiming that it is difficult to prove that belief in God is irrational and possible to suggest ways in which belief meets the requirement of rationality. Some varieties of singular existentials. Thus, God could avoid creating such circumstances, thereby weakly actualizing a world with only moral good. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion: 123—32. Semantic inadequacies of counterpart theories -- A. Finally, in the appendix, I address Quinean objections to quantified modal logic.
Philosophers do not suggest that such possible worlds actually exist, but they describe a possible world as a thought experiment to demonstrate what is necessarily true, necessarily false, or at least possible. Classic laws of logic—the law of non-contradiction, identity, and the excluded middle—are debated in the same manner that non-classical accounts of logic are articulated and defended. He moved, therefore, from a discussion of the justification of knowledge to a notion of warrant. Given his perfect goodness, we would expect God to minimize the amount of evil in the world as far as possible. But whether this offers a real solution of the problem is another question. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at the University of Notre Dame and the inaugural holder of the Jellema Chair in Philosophy at Calvin College.
It is possibly true not necessarily that any world God actualizes has P doing wrongly. But the problem is that no philosopher has ever been able to identify such premises. The classical argument fails -- 3. Anselmo said something like this, although this is not the official version: 1. Ready for your next read? Together they converge on the truth, and in finding truth, they help us to see, enjoy, and then praise God. The second proposition is more contentious.
While such a question seems arcane, it does allow Plantinga to furnish the theist with a number of highly useful concepts and tools, like possible worlds. A mistaken modal version -- 5. Plantinga is widely known for his work in philosophy of religion, epistemology, metaphysics and Christian apologetics. To create creatures capable of moral good, therefore, He must create creatures capable of moral evil; and He can't give these creatures the freedom to perform evil and at the same time prevent them from doing so. In Nature of Necessity, Plantinga explains the use of possible worlds philosophy. God's existence and natural evil -- 11.
The Nature of Necessity Alvin Plantinga Explores and defends the motion of modality de re, the idea that objects have both essential and accidental properties. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. This account of warrant, therefore, depends essentially upon the notion of proper function. In such a world people could have chosen to only perform good deeds, even though all their choices were predestined. And this dependence of the question of warrant or rationality on the truth or falsehood of theism leads to a very interesting conclusion. As it turned out, sadly enough, some of the free creatures God created went wrong in the exercise of their freedom; this is the source of.